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INTRODUCTORY NOTES
The first drah of this paper was produced in late 1969 for the Institute of Water Resources at the
University of Alaska as a tina/completion report to the Office of Water Resources Research,
Department of the Interior. The or)ginal title of the paper, and the titie of the project grant, was,
''Water Resource Utilization Conflicts in Cook Inlet; Some Economic Considerations." Since the
time of the first draft, public attention has been focused upon the hazards of crude oil spills from
tankers and terminal facilities associated with the proposed pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez.
The University's Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research,with which both
authors were affiliated l • determined that parts of the Cook Inlet study would be of sufficient
public interest in the form of the occasional paper found herein.
This paper has been condensed and revised and is devoted prrncipally to the institutional
alternatives for water quality management in Alaska. Very little of significance from the original
version of the paper has been deleted, although the total text has been considerably shortened.
The paper does not purport to introduce any novelty in analyses or policy, but presents some of
the current thinking of economists regarding poUution control in the Alaskan context.
1 Gregg Erickson is presently a staff member of the Alaska Legislature's Joint Pipeline Impact
Committee. Professor Tussing continues to be associated with the Institute of Social, EconomIc &
Government Research at the University of Alaska.
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WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT: WATER AS A DISPOSAL MEDIUM
Rivers, streams, bays and inlets are often the most efficient vehicles for disposal of unwanted
materials and energy--the residuals or waste products that are an inevitable result of any human
activity. However, theabllityof each body of water to transport, disperse, and degrade wastes is
finite. When the utility of water resources for uses othet than waste disposal is reduced, the waste
products invo/vedare· regarded as pollutants. The object of water quality management in
particular, and water resource policy in general, is to attempt to balance the benefits from routine
waste disposal and other uses at the margin, thereby maintaining the mix and intensity of resource
utilization that optimizes the total net benefits received by society.
If the various costs and benefits, their sources and interrelationships are well understood, it is
possible to pursue this optimal balance through the apparatus of centralized decision-making
authority. Social norms, existing patterns of water resource utilization, the projected pattern of
future demand, and political realities should all be considered. A "comprehensive water resource
utilization plan" can then be adopted,calling for this or that modification ofexisting patterns of
use and specifying in greater or lesser detail the most advantageous directions for future
development. Usually, water quality management has become institutionalized incidentally to
some other need for resource planning, such as hydro power development, navIgation
improvement, irrigation, flood control, or some combination of these.
Centralized Pollution Control
. Public Law 660, "Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956.'" and subsequent legislation
authorized comprehensive management of water quality in interstate waters and have not been
implemented with increasing frequency in recent years, usually only after problems of chronic
pollution have begun to seem intolerable. With a few notable exceptions, such efforts have been
greatly successful in the United States. Usually, the desirability of collectively institutionalized
control of the water resource management function was not recognized or generalfy accepted until
streams and estuaries were so loaded with pollutants that the costs, public and private, of disposal
appeared extraordinarily high. As long as the estuarine and riverine waste disposals systems were
working at less than capacity, there was little need for centralized control, and, even after such
needs became apparent, there remained strong ideological commitment in favor of decentralized
decision-making and economic individualism. European experience has apparently been more
successful, perhaps partially because of a contrasting willingness to submit to centralized
management.J
Not even perfect knOWledge and unlimited authority in the hands of wise men can be expected to
bring about an immediate rationalization of water resource utilization. Such a rationalization can
so disturb the existing patterns of production and distribution as to create costs that are larger
than those originally being attacked. For instance, short run opportunity costs associated with idle
'70 Stat. 498.
3 See Kn••s., (1964[6])
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plant and equipment may make the immediate closure of an existing industrial activity
undesirable, even where hindsight clearly indicates that the facility should never have been
established in the first place. And, as a practical matter, the economic interests of established
industries are generally well protected, both politically and legally.4
Management agencies typically have· single or limited purposes and powers under their legislative
authority; they also tend to have specialized private constitutencies who resist granting them
mandates to consider more complex sets of objectives. Even complete jurlsdiction over human
inputs into the water system wauldnat assure the ability to balance the benefits of alternative
river and estuary uses according to the agency's own view· of the public interest. To do so would
reqUire influence over all aspects of future regional development. Water management authorities
generally have no power to prevent the construction of high value structures in flood plains, nor
over paving and removal of vegetation in the runoff basin.s
Lack of knowledge presents the greatest single barrier to centralized management of water
pollution. A most obvious requirement is for complete information regarding the degree to which
beneficial uses of a watersource are curtailed as a consequence of various types and levels of
pollution. For instance, lacking pollution controls of any sort, downstream users would still want
to understand the physical and/or biological relationships between pollutants and "water quality"
as they define it. Although there arelllany difficulties in obtaining such complete information,
they are not unique to control of pollution under a central authority.
A more serious problem, however, tarises indetermining the "benefits" of pollution, and the costs
involved in prohibiting or restricting it. These costs and benefits are likely to be intimately
associated with the cost and revenue structure of each individual polluting firm, as well as the
technological constraints under which it operates. The profit margins available to pay for pollution
control, the reduction in pollution obtainable from a given expenditure, and the importance of
waste disposal services in relation to the firm's other productive inputs are alf factors that will be
different for each polluter, and upon which the optimum level of effluent discharge will depend.
Most questions regarding the· most efficient means of producing· a· given product or service are
decided in a decentralized ma·nner. That is, individual firms make the decisions, and there is no
existing institutional structure for channeling necessary information to a central authority .In
addition, there may be difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of various firms, because in many
cases the polluter or would·be polluter wHi have an interest in seeing that the pollution control
authority is misinformed or poorly informed on some or all of the relevant questions.
Another problem of centralized control is that this individualized control of individual firms is
reqUired for efficient resource management. An· alternative-method of waste dIsposal, or a process
4 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. vs. Sanderson 113 Pa., 126, 6A (1886) and discussion in Sax
1968 (pp. 442 et seq.)
5 James A. Crutchfield has called the authors' attention to the fact that development of the
Puget Sound area has diminished the region's salmon resource far more by urbanization's
elimination of small spawning streams than be eitherovernshing or pollution as usually
understood. Ironically, both sport and commercial fishing interests have concentrated all their
attention on the last two influences.
3or product modification that reduces residuals production, may be easily available for one
polluter, whereas another may find such alternatives either very costly or totally unavailable. Very
few benefits will be foregone by the former operator because of his ability to utilize other
methods of waste disposal or control; similar restrictions on the latter operator wHlhave a much
more serious effect on the benefits flowing from his operation, and may even be severe enough to
eliminate what would otherwise be a socially and economically viable enterprise. If the pollution
created by each operator is of the same magnitude, and causes the same loss of utility to
downstream water resource users, then considerably more stringent restrictions on the first
operator will be necessary to balance out these benefits than would be appropriate for the second
operator.
For instance, suppose that two firms, A and B, produce a similar product, earn about the same
profit, are located near each other on the same river, 'and are each dumping twenty units of the
same pollutants into the river each day. If firm A finds it much less expensive to provide
alternative methods of dealing with residuals than does firmB, any arbitrary restriction on the
amount of pollution permissable will have a more severe impact on firm B. In the case ofthe cost
functions shown in Figure 1, an arbitrarily imposed restriction of ten units of pollution per firm
per day would cost firm B $500 per day and firm A $100 per day. for a total private expenditure
of $600 per day. Such a restriction wou Id be desirable if the 20 units per day reduction in the
pollution load increases the stream's utility to downstream users by an amount equivalent to more
. than that $600 per day. In principle, the optimum restriction is that level at which the firms' costs
from a small reduction in the quantity discharged just equal the gained benefits.
Because of their ease in enforcement andadrninistration, many authorities concerned with
pollution control have attempted to set arbitrary limitations on the quantity of pollution
allowable from individual firms. 6 These are generally referred to as "quality standards" rather than
quantity limitations, although control of both parameters is usually implicit in the actual
limitations.
The attractiveness of this method of water management is mitigated, however I hy its inefficiency.
This inefficiency is iilustrated by reference to the prior example. where $600 of private
expenditure purchased a remission of 20 units per day in the pollution load. The respective slopes ~
of the cost functions in Figure 1, however, show that a much greater reduction in the amount of
pollution could be obtained by shifting more of the $600 per day expenditure to firm A, If the
reduction in river pollution from firm B is graphed against the reduction from firm A, as in Figure
2, the resulting curve represents the "reduction possibility function" for $600 per day of private
expenditures. The point at which a 45 degree line is tangent to this curve is the point at which a
dollar of pollution control expenditure by firm A purchases exactly the same reduction· as the
same dollar diverted to firm B. Figure 2 indicates that a shift in either direction from this point
would result in a smaller reduction in the total amount of pollution obtained with the $600 per
day rate of private expenditure, and as a consequence the tangency represents the optimum
operating point for this level of expenditure.
6Kneese (1964 [b], 1965) discusses the nature of these standards and examines their
economic implications in detail. Also see Senate Docwnent No. 97, 87th Congress, Policies.:
Standards and Procedures in the Formulation t Evaluation and Review of Plans for Use ana
Development of Water and Related Land Resources. (1962).
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FIGURE 1 If each firm is prohibited from dumping more than ten units per day, the total
reduction in pollution will amount to twenty· units per day (ten units cutback for
each firm); total cost in the private sector will be $100 + $500 = $600 per day.
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FIGURE 2 Pollution reduction possibility function. Combined pollution control spending of
$600 per day by firms A and B will reduce pollution by an amount dependent on b
expenditure split between the two firms. Curve traces the various relationships ~I·:
between reduction in A and B's pollution. giving total private spending of $600 per •
day. i
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5Various techniques are available for estimating the aggregate benefits accruing to downstream
water resource users from abatement of a given quantity of pollution, and similar methods can be
used to estimate the total (private) costs of bringing about that reduction; but because such
techniques depend on'the lawaf large numbers, their usefulness is contingent on there being a
sufficiently large number of individual units in the group being measured, so that individual
differences effectively cancel one another. As a conseq'uence, the policy maker engaged in
pollution management can set overall "water quality standards" specifying the aggregate level of
pollution allowable in any given river or estuary, with fair confidence that overall marginal costs
and benefits are capable of being balanced at or somewhere near that level. He does not however,
have the information or the methodology to decide which elements of the private sector will pay
what part of the private costs. In such an instance there is little way to assure the public that
pollution control is being exercised fairly except on the basis of some f9rmula or rule that is both
readily understood and easily applied.
Decentralized Pollution Control
One way of circumventing this difficulty would be to decentralize the decision making process
itselL At the extreme, the entire control activity might be referred to some sort of self correcting
market system. Under such a scheme the "right to pollute:' and the right to be free of pollution.
would be bought and sold in a market in which prices would be determined by the interaction of
supply and demand. Ideally. such a system would eliminate the need for government participation
in the decision making process.
An obvious difficulty in this solution is that such a market is very difficult to create or maintain
because of "externalities:' the fact that the goods involved are "public" goods and are enjoyed or
consumed collectively rather than individually. Assume for a moment that petroleum wastes could
be disposed of in Cook Inlet or Prince William Sound without restriction. but that the oil industry
offered, for a price, to curtail its polluting activities. Presumably those who would benefit from
such a curtailment .. commercial fishermen, sports fishermen, etc., .. would consider such a
proposition, but unless one individual or well organized group of individuals is sufficiently
interested in seeing the pollution abated to pay the whole price, this price will not be paid.
Because there is no way to prevent non-payers from enjoying the benefits of freedom from
pollution, they cannot be coerced into assuming a share of the cost. As a practical matter, the·
abatement offered for sale in the above example would probably never be purchased because no
potential buyer is likely to realize sufficient benefits to justify paying the asking price. An equal
difficulty is that benefits of unrestricted disposal privileges are, in the same sense as the costs,
enjoyed collectively. For example, how does one determine the eligibility for, and share of, any
payment for not doing something.
Some sort of collective action is called for in cases of this sort. The appropriate form for this
collective action will depend at least partly on the political-legal situation and the existing patterns
of resource utilization. If an individual, a firm, or a municipality has been enjoying free use of an
estuary or watercourse for the purpose of waste disposal, it is likely to view its access to the
disposal medium as a property right; inalienable except by due process. The vested interests
supporting this view may be so powerful as to render unrealistic any pollution control scheme that
6does not recognize these ugrandfather" rights. In Alaska, at least, no such legal right exists unless
such right was freely exercised prior to statehood, except insofar as such rights may have been
granted by the state through permit, lease, or patent.
Allowing existing sources of pollution to continue unchecked can work in several ways to deflect a
region from the optimum growth path. ParticularlY, some aspects of outdoor recreation may find
it difficult or impossible to develop in the face of polluted water. Downstream users of water may
find it necessary to devote an inordinate amount of their resources to securing an adequate supply
of the proper quality water! Finally, the existing level of "grandfather" pollution may make it
necessary to impose excessively strict limits on the quantity and types of wastes that industrial
newcomers may dispose of in the public waters.
Even where the balance of politicalpowerand legal opinion is not biased in favor of the "historic"
pOlluter, economic efficiency is a pivotal cOAsideration that often argues against "changing the
rules" after the game is well under way. Where waste disposal services are an important factor of
production, considerable fixed investment may have been made on the assumption that such
services would be available essentially without cost. A change in the rules, by increasing the costs
of waste disposal, may make a firm's or industry's operations unprofitable, an~ thereby cause all
or part of that investment to be lost. The cost to society of this disinvestment may be greater than
the costs of allowing the waste l discharge to continue for the remaInder of theinvestment"s
economic life. Subsidies, either paid dir~ctJy to the affected firms or in the form of low interest
loans for pollution control investment, have been suggested· in these. cases. The misallocative effect
of such devices can be demonstrated by the same line of reasoning that was used above with regard
to arbitrarily invoked standards.8
\Vhen along established pattern or industrial or municipal waste disposal suddenly becomes
objectionable because of a ~hange in public tastes and perceptions, it poses a political and legal
problem; as such, economicsprovides only partial insight to its solution.
Imposing the Cost of Pollution on the Polluter
The logical alternative to allowing free access to or useofa resource is to place a price on that
access. The use of the public waterways for purposes of waste disposal imposes costs on society.
The proper price for such use of a river or inlet is the charge which produces just enough revenue
exactly to compensate for the losses and/or the unpleasantness that must be put up with as a
consequence· of that use. He who would use the public's river as a sewer should pay the public's
price for putting up with his sewage.9
'However, recent studies (Davis, 1966). (Ayers and Kneese,l9G9) indicate that very little in
the way of abatement effort can be paid for from the savings in treatment costs realized by
downstream users. In a sufficient proportion of industrial and municipal uses: (boiler feed water,
domestic water supply) some sort of treatment will be necessary at the intaKe regardless of the
actions of upstream users. Within broad limits. the costs of bringing water up to usual standards of
purity do not vary greatly in response to changes in the initial quality of the water. The most
conspicuous economic effect is a result of offenses to recreational opportunities and aesthetic
perceptions.
'Cf, Kneese (1964 [bJ, chapter 8) and Kamien, et aI. (1966).
9 An excellent survey of the issue of effluent pricing is found in cF Letter. IIShould we now
turn to effluent charges - another weapon available for the war against pollution," June 1971.
Washington: The Conservation Foundation.
7Control of pollution by means of a pricing mechanism is superior in many ways to the traditional
authoritarian methods. It explicitly takes into account the fact that the appropriate level of
residuals discharge wIll vary in response to changing conditions, including the economic conditions
under which the waste producer operates. Use of a pricing system allows abandonment of the
tenuous assumption that water qualitY isa matter of only two states, the acceptable and the
unacceptable, which the enforcement of "water quality standards" generally imposes. A schedule
of charges can be constructed that reflects the more appropriate assumption of a continuous,
directly increasing relationship between the pollution load of a stream or inlet and the
externalitjes~·thecosts which do not show up on the polluter's balance sheet.
Stripped to its basic elements, the use of a pricing mechanism leads to the simple equilibration of
supply and demand. Being sold are waste disposal services. The demand for these services is derived
from considerations such as the availability and cost of substitutes, the factors' relative importance
in the productive process, the demand for the final output of that process, etc. The supply
function on the other hand describes the "bribes" that the polluters must offer society to obtain
their permission to dispose of each particular/evel of waste.
The system described above is a hybrid, requiring centralized control and a political determination
for its supply function, but permitting decentralization on the demand side. The conspicuous
advantage of such a system is that at any given level of total private spending for waste disposal,
expenditures both on differing methods of disposal within a firm can improve its position by
shifting any expenditure from providing alternative means of waste disposal to the purchase, of
dumping rights from the pUblic pollution authority orvice versa. As a consequence, private costs
are minimized. Since costs eventually become charges for the final outputs the public purchases,
and/or lower incomes for producers, minimizing these also minimizes the ultimate price paid by
the public for any given level of abatement.
Effluent pricing is particularly appropriate to and feasible in the "competitive" case, where there
are many heterogeneous sources of discharge. In these instances, the response to price changes will
be continuous, allowing the use of small rate changes to approachand maintain the desired levels
of water quality by trial and error. Technical rigidity and indivisibilities will make the adjustment
process less efficient in "monopsonistic" or "oligoposonistic"cases, Le., where the demand for
waste disposal services is dominated by one or a handful of firms; here, fees are likely to be
negotiated rather than finding their own way to the desired equilibrium value. If the intended level
of pollution appears relatively harmless, and the permit is granted, a more subtle question arises.
By what course of action does the management authority serve equity and efficiency when, after
the plant is in operation, another firm proposes a similar facility and demands equal access to
environmental waste disposal services? What, indeed, is to be done if the effluent from one plant is
socially costless, but a doublfng of that output brings about a dramatic qualitative change, raising
pollution to an intolerable level?
Treatment of waste disposal as a publicly marketed service allows these questions to be addressed
in a fami liar context. Almost all firms purchase their raw materials and other factor inputs in
markets where the parameters of supply and demand are constantly shifting. If the supply of a
factor of production is relatively unresponsive to changes in the quantity demanded, and if the
Blevel of demand is likely to increase (for instance, because of new firms entering the field) the
factor price is likely to rise. The successful firm will consider these possibilities and plan to
minimize the internal dislocations caused by fluctuations of this sort.
In the case of waste disposal service, the government would presumably first set the price of
disposal rights at a low level, refiecting the correspondingly low cost that the initial level of
pollution imposes on society. Rational managers would not expect this state of affairs to be
permanent, and would anticipate future public and administrative attitudes toward higher levels of
pollution. With an assessment of the probability of new firms establishing themselves nearby and
thus increasing the demand for disposal services, managers would make the necessary guesses about
future costs of pollution in the same manner as for other costs.
There are comparable issues about who should conduct, and who should pay for, the necessary
information acquisition. In one sense, the requirement for information is a social cost of the
proposed investment, and its burden ought to be on the beneficiaries of that investment (Le., its
owners and the consumers of its output). On the other hand, the party controlling the information
output will understandably tend to withhold or release data selectively in order to bias the actions
of others. It follows, therefore, that the government should be very cautious about accepting the
scientific or technical presentations of anyone applying for a pollution permit without having
some independent means of verification.
WATER QUALITY, MANAGEMENT: EPISOOIC POLLUTION
Preparing for the Unpredictable
The preceding analysis has shown howlt may be useful to think of water pollution questions in
terms of waste disposal services as a· scarce factor of·production, the use of which is in competition
with other valuable uses of the disposal medium. In many of the most important cases, however,
such services are not a normal pnd easily measured input to some productive activity. These cases
are marked by long periods during which the demands for waste disposal services can be easily met
by the assimilative capacity of the body of water, punctuated by sudden and unpredictable
episodes in which the resource is called upon to dispose of massive quantities of discharge over a
short period of time. Pollution of this sort is usually unplanned, the result of an operational
human error, mechanical misfunction, or the physical failure of some system component. Breakage
of underwater petroleum pipelines and oil tanker groundings are two familiar examples of such
causes.
Management of this type of demand for waste disposal services tends to be more complex due to
its unpredictability and infrequent occurrence. Assessing the "costs" of a pollution "incident"
after the fact is complicated by the necessity of reconstructing a sequence of. events from limited
and often conflicting observations. When observing the effects of a continuous discharge of
effluent, an investigator can repeatedly return to the field to fill in gaps in his data; with episodic
pollution phenomena, the investigator must necessarily wait for the next incident, which may not
come for months or years. A "similar" incident may never occur. Moreover, since the victims of
these incidents can not be identified nor the magnitude or distribution of costs assessed in
I
9advance, there is no satisfactory way of compensating potential losers for the hazards to which
they are exposed. Nevertheless, efficient utilization 9f water resources will natbe achieved unless
techniques can be found for evaluating the probability and both the magnitude and distribution of
the social costs of such events.
This is especially true in Alaska, which has· few problems with chronic industrial discharge. On the
other hand, episodic pollution is well-known. From 1960 through the first half of 1968, there
\Nere 111 known crude oil spills in Cook Inlet. Submarine pipelines carrying crude from offshore
platforms to shore stations have on several occasions leaked or been broken. Marine tankers
bringing refined products up the Inlet to Anchorage and picking up crude have been the proximate
cause of several types of pollution incidents. Overflows or valving errors during oil transfer
operations have occasionally resulted in spills, and, finally, tank rupture due to collision with
underwater hazards or other vessels has, in three known instances, resulted in serious episodic
pollution.1 0 Twelve of the known spills resulted from pipeline failures, 12 from tanker operations,
58 from drilling platforms (37 of them in 19681, 17 from oil drill rigs and service boats, and 12
traceable to onshore oil facilities. I 1 The Inlet has been spared a blowout disaster of Santa Barbara
proportions or a really large tanker spill.
That spills have not caused much harm is mainly a result of the exceptional mlxmg and
biodegradation that take place there,I2 but it also appears to be due, in part, to the very short
periods of the year in which wildlife are vulnerable to such hazards. Between 1960 and 1969, there
.was only one incident in which wildlife is known to have been killed because of oil industry __ This
case involved the loss of between 50 and 2,500 ducks as a consequence of what is presumed to
have been a several hundred barrel spill from an unidentified tanker. The only other incident with
a significant wildlife effect involved a moored drilling vessel in Seldovia 8ay, which apparently
discharged fuel oil into the harbor. The extent of wildlife loss, if any, from this incident is
unknown.
Thus far, the platforms themselves have not been the immediate source of any serious pollution
accidents. Nevertheless, they probablY represent one of the more important hazards due to the
quantities of crude that might be discharged if storm, ice impact, ship strike, fire, or other force
were to cause a massive failure in a platform's structure.
Rounding out these episodic hazards posed by the oil industry activity are those connected with
drilling operations, whether conducted from a permanent platform or drilling vessel. Even in the
development drilling of thoroughly understood formations, it is not possible to be wholly certain
that high pressure fluids contained in rocks tapped by the well bore can not somehow find their
way uncontrolled to the surface. The danger of such a blowout or an unexpected "kick"is
naturally more severe during exploratory drilling; one such event has actually occurred in the Inlet.
lOIn this context "serious" has been taken to mean more than 100 barrels.
1 1 From authors' inspection of records in Anchorage office of FWQA.
I2See Kinney, Button, Schell, and Robertson, 1970.
10
Fortunately, it was possible to bum off the natural gas and natural gasolines that vented
uncontrollably over the many months that it took to plug the blowout. Had the higher pressure
fluids included significant amounts of heavy crude oil, this blowout might have become as
infamous as the 1969 incident in the Santa Barbara Channel.
\lVhile the presence of petroleum operations inthe Inlet has not imposed significant costs on other
users of the resource, the existence of those other users has significantly increased the costs of
operations to offshore oil drillers. The exact magnitude of these costs is difficult to estimate
because many of the pollution control expenditures produce ancillary benefits to the operator in
terms of safety and operatonal efficiency. For instance, of several operators contacted, all said the
installation of the wellhead and downhole pressure control devices would have been required even
if pollution hazard control had not been a design consideration. Other facilities, such as skim
tanks, are primarily for pollution control, but also increase the quantity of crude oil recovered,
thus partially paying for themselves. Total capital costs of these items are probably in the
neighborhood of $100,000 per platform.
Three Approaches to Episodic Pollution
No blanket theory can be given for managing water resources in the face of these threats. In most
cases, there seems to be three distinct approaches to developing formalized management.
Engineering
The first of these might be called the ".engineering approach, since it relies heavily on the
engineering expertise of the government authority. Most cases of episodic pollution are not
completely unexpected, even if it is not possible to predict the time and place of their occurrence.
Steps can be taken during the design and construction phase of such facilities as pipelines and
offshore platforms to reduce the probability of future episodic pollution. Regulations regarding
cementing of wells, the placernent of valves on offshore pipelines, depth of burial, thickness of
pipe, and types of inspection procedures to be used during construction are examples of such
steps.
One disadvantage of relying on this method is that there is almost never any effort devoted to
justifying the additional effort that these regUlations require on the basis of the protection they
purchase. Regulations and requirements are usually adopted or rejected on the basis of their
absolute effectiveness in maintaining a given level of water quality, rather than their
cost-effectiveness. In these circumstances, the management authority will ordinarily tend toward
overprotection.
Since there are no institutionalized channels for feedback of cost information into the decision
process under the engineering approach, the regulated industry or interest group, particularly if it
is cohesive and well organized, will tend to have ex parte means of bringing its influence to bear.
This can result in the capture of the management authority. by the interest which is ostensibly
being regulated. The highly technological nature of hazard control questions makes their ex parte
consideration more likely, since the industry may have a monopoly or near monopoly on the
necessary expertise.
11
Fines, Penalties and Civil Liabilities
The second approach toward management of episodic pollution is through the levying of fines or
charges against those who generate it. Prior to permitting any activity which constitutes a threat to
the environment or to any beneficial interest in a resource, the management authority would
specify the various hazards and the penalty to be paid if harm materializes. Hazards would thereby
oocome private hazards, to be contended with by those who are best situated to control them.
This method has the advantage of placing the responsibility for prevention on the shoulders of
those who are best situated to judge the cost·effectivenessof particular measures and to implement
them. Disadvantages associated with the approach are the -necessity of maIntaining constant
surveillance and the difficulty of measuring the dimensions of each incident so that charges can be
levied. There is also the problem of identifying the victims and determining their proper
compensation. A further problem may arise if the potential sources of large scale pollution
incidents are relatively small fIrms. In such cases, the hazard is created by an autonomous decision
making unit that may be too small to internalize expectation of the social costs generated by Its
activities. To take an extreme example, an undercapitalized wildcatter might drill a well ina
location where a blowout could cause a large scale pollution incident. From the point ofview of
such a promoter who fully expects his firm to be bankrupt at the conclusion of drilling if he does
not make a major discover, the extra costs of blowout protection may not be worthwhile.
In a different context, one of the authors of this paper has compared the engineering and penalty
approaches:
There are two ways in which we can look at the effectiveness of environmental
stipulations-do tbey provide the maximum protection in exchange for a given level of
additional engineering expense? Or, do they contribute some given level of protection at the
lowest possible cost?
It is simply not rational to spend a million dollars to preserve a $50,000 resource. Nor is it
rational to spend a million dollars to avoid a 10 per cent chance of a million dollar accident.
On the otber hand, some kinds of damage or risk of damage cannot be avoided by any kind
of stipulation if oil is to be produced or a pipeline is to be built at ali.
Putting a value on intangible and latent resources and assigning dollar numbers to different
kinds and degrees of risk are complicated issues . . . Many of the same difficulties are
encountered regularly in appraising and insuring private properties, and tbe same principles
can be used as in ordinary business practice with a greater or smaller degree of error.
There will obviously be a great deal of arbitrariness in assigning doliar values to such tbings as
the violation of wilderness or tbe degradation of scenery. But even arbitrary appraisals are
superior to their alternatives··the assumption tbat these things are eitber wortbless, in which
case we should forbid development under any circumstance. Assigning prices affords a way of
ranking different values, so that the greater effort is expended to protect more important
things rather than the less important. The greatest advantage of tbis approach, however, is
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that even prices which are wholly "wrong" give [the pipeline company] a continuing
incentive to reduce damage-an incentive which is absent if they are told exactly whe~e and
how to proceed.' 3
The analogous private remedy to penalties levied by the government is the civil damage suit.
Federal legislation and international agreements have undermined this remedy by limiting
maximum liabilIty tor anyone spill, but states apparently may authorize broader liability within
their internal waters. In the absence of specific legislation providing for "absolute" liability,
however, the burden may be upon the complainant to prove negligence. Moreover, maritime law
does not impose liability on the owner of the cargo for damages arising from its transportation.
This fact encourages oil companies to use chartered vessels, or to incorporate each vessel in their
petroleum carriage separately, in order to avoid liability In excess of the value of this ship and its
cargo. l4
The argument for unlimited absolute Iiability··that is, responsibility for damages not limited to
some maximum, nor contigent on proof .of negligence··seems to be unassailable from the
standpoint of economic effIciency and equity. Similarly, liability ought to be extended to owners
of hazardous cargoes. By choosIng, for instance, to ship crude oil on commonly owned (or
"unowned") waters, a petroleum company imposes a risk of damage to other parties, even if there
is not legally recognizable negligence. This expectation Is a cost, as is any individual Instance of
damage. These costs of transporting the product properly ought to be upon its beneficiaries, the
consumers of petroleum products, and recipients of petroleum profits and rents. Anything less
than absolute and unlimited Iiability- shifts part of the expected costs to others·-commercial
fishermen, coastal residents and landowners, tourists and recreatlonists.The assertion that those
who bear the risks are lncidenta Ily consumers of the same petroleum products, or beneficiaries of
the revenues of the government captures these activities, is notnecessarily true, but if it were, the
point would remain that the costs are being distributed entirely independently of the benefits.
A serious obstacle to relianrce upon the civil law to deter polluters and to compensate Itsvictims is
the difficulty in assigning losses in the case of unowned assets, such as stocks of fish, or even
estimating their magnitude where the asset damagedjs both unowned and unmarketed, as is the
case with the scenic attributes ·of public·lands and waters. l s
13 Statement by ArIon R. Tussing on the "Application of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
for a right of way to construct a pipeline from Alaska's North Slope to Valdez, Alaska" before the
U. S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Mfairs. In U. S. Senate, "The Status of the
Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline," Part 2, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 1969.
14 A. ·R. Thompson of the University of British Columbia School of Law has prepared a
Comparative Table of Statutory Provisions Regulating Oil Pollution of the Sea (April. 1971). Also
see Thompson, 1971-
15 Douglas Clarke (quoted in Dales, 1968) offers an instructive contrast between the legal
vulnerability of l'common property resources" in North America and the treatment of privately
owned angling right in Great Britain. Where these rights are owned and marketable l damage to
them by pollution can be dealt with like any other injury to private froperty. According to Clarke,
the Angler's Cooperative Association in Britain is usuallysuccessfu in actions to prevent or abate
pollution.
--_.~._..._---~~-
~_ .._._---~------_._-_._.-
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Collective Insurance
The third approach toward eptsodtc pollution might be called the collective insurance method, for
it involves regular payments compensate for the expos,ure to the hazard, instead of sporadic
payments associated with particular incidents. This arrangement is appropriate provided that
adequate measures already exist to reduce the risk of incidents. The insurance charges collected
from private operators would (in theory) just be enough to deter those operations whose activities
fail to produce social benefits in excess of public hazards.
Where the state (which collects the insurance payments) is also the owner of the exploited lands,
as in the case of offshore petroleum development in Alaska, the required payments would offset
part of the rents (principally in the form of bonus payments) accruing from those lands. At the
point where payments soak up the whole potential rent, so that the present value ofa lease is
negative, the lands simply would not be leased. From the point of view of allocativeefficiency,
those hazards over which the operator has direct control should be internalized through penalty
charges or the [ike. Since insurance type schemes reduce the operator's incentive to take
technically feasible precautions, they are most usefully employed where the risks are essentially
beyond control, but where one function of the insurance charge is to determine whether·-given
those risks--the venture should be undertaken at all.
WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT: ALASKA
The preceding discussion has been a cursory treatment of economists' ways of looking at problems
of water quality. The literature of water resource .managementand environmentalec:onomics from
which it is drawn is addressed primarily to the problems of regions that are already highly
developed; its very existence as a specialized area of inquiry is a consequence of measurable
property damage and of expressed feelings, ranging from uneasiness to outrage, of people living
where the free use of waste disposal capacities of water bodies has already reduced their utility for
other purposes.
The body of knowledge that has recently developed in response to this sttmulus should be the
intellectual foundation for any systematic effort to attack the problems of water resource
allocation in any undeveloped area in Alaska or elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is necessary to give
emphasis to the striking contrasts between the physical, economic, and (to a lesser extent) social
environment of most of the rivers' and estuaries of Alaska and the examples which one finds
throughout the literature of water resource economics.
Alaska's greatest waste loads, domestic or industrial, are concentrated in Cook Inlet, but there is
little concrete evidence to indicate that any beneficial use of the Inlet has been reduced or
restricted as a consequence. The major potential source of pollution, oil industry activity in Cook
Inlet, has been discussed above. Despite the popular concern for the Inlet's and Alaska's fish and
wildlife resources in the face of industrial and municipal development, these resources and their
values, however measured, have not been seriously reduced.
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PrDgram Planning fDr Water Quality
Inasmuch as Alaska has at present very little demDnstrable damage because Df water pDllutiDn,
Alaska's water quality management plans must concentrate on identifying resource utilization
cDnflicts that can be expected to develDp in the future, rather than emphasizing the resDlutiDn Df
existing conflicts. Already, most existing and proposed pollution control measures for thisregion
are designed to prevent the development of conflicting uses. In such a context, the questions that
must be answered deal with the prDbability that a cDnflict will develDp, the actual cost Df such a
conflict should it develop, and the costs of its prevention. It may very well be that prevention is
more costly than cure, or even that both are unnecessary.
Identifying future resource utilization conflicts will require an information base adequateto
estimate the economic and demographic directions of the region. It is logical that this information
should be in hand prior to intensive work being undertaken toward evaluating the physical and
biDIDgical aspects of pDssibie cDnflicts. This does not mean that investigatiDn Df the physical and
biDIDgical characteristics Df the water shDuld be ignDred, but rather that investigatiDns should nDt
specialize on the relationships between particUlar parameters until economic information indicates
that human activity will either affect those parameters or be affected by them.
No objective criteria can be laid down to guide the decision maker in choosing the information
relevant or important tohis tasks. Much, of course, will depend on how the tasks and priorities are
defined. Nevertheless, the fDIIDwing DbservatiDns and pDlicy suggestiDns mqy be useful tD
understanding and-where appropriate-making use of economic ways of examining problems of
'Nater resource management in Alaska.
From the point of view of resource allocation, the services provided by a body of water should be
distinguished one from another in two functional ways: First, the provision of such service
requires the water to possess specific physical and biological characteristics. Second~ services can
be classed according to the manner and degree to Which their provision modifies thenature of
'Nater. These requirements ca~ be thought of asinputs i and the modifications as outputs, of a
service providing process.
In the more developed areas, it has been found useful to stimulate these inputs and outputs in a
model Df the water bDdy under study. Such a mDdel may be a very cDmplex mathematical
structure, but the idea behind it is very simple: rather than speculating blindly about future
contingencies, it is often more productive to introduce the event in question into an artificial
system and observe the results. It is possible to extract much useful information at a small cost
frDm such a mDdel, even when the physical relationships are pDDrly understDDd. MDdels may be as
simple or as complex as desired; depending on objectives, they may be inclusive as many inputs
and outputs, and relationships among them, or just a few.
MDdeling techniques can be applied tD many Df the present prDblems Df water quality management
inAJaska, including for example, the assessment of the pollution hazards of large tankers using
Prince William SDund. Data frDm CDDk Inlet, the English Channel, the Persian GUlf, and Dther
areas of high density tanker movement, could help illuminate the relationship between traffic
1
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volume and weather conditions, and the probability of oil spills from collision or grounding.
Historic Prince William Sound weather patterns' and expected traffic movements to and from
Valdez can be combined with existing knowledge about the manner in which tidal and other
currents would transport any spilled oil to infer the probable size, location, frequency, and
dispersal of oil spills. This information, even in a pr'obablistic form, will assist scientists in
determining priorities in applied research. For instance, with adequate cooperating inputs from
marine biologists, such information might indicate. whether the principal hazards from the tankers
were to bottom fish and invertebrates, waterfowl, or salmon.
Another use of modeling would be in evaluating the effectiveness of alternative navigation systems
in an area such as Prince William Sound and its approaches. In each system the expected frequency
and size distribution of position errors is generally known in advance. In many cases a small
reduction in the magnitude and frequency of navigational errors can be obtained only at a great
cost in additional system capacity. Whether the cost is justified can be evaluated by comparing the
number of groundings and collisions that would occur in several hundred years of experience
simulated by the model for alternative systems.
Administrative Innovations
On the whole, existing agencies are not organized to seek out this kind of information on benefits
and costs, nor to use it in allocating the services and values available from Alaska's water resources.
Formulation of legislation to restructure institutions in this direction requires considenition of
factors that go beyond the scope of this study. On the basis of economic theory, however, it is
possible to identify some general organizational innovations that might improve allocative
efficiency in water resource utilization.
The advantages to charging polluters for their use of the public waters have been discussed above.
It was suggested that these charges should be based on an analysis of the benefits foregone as a
consequence of the pollution under consideration; it was pointed out that such charges shOUld be
increased or decreased in response to the changing opportunities for beneficial use of the water
resource and the level of demand for services it provides.
Regardless of the political and social constraints taken into account in developing governmental
structures to handle these matters, their determination requires a degree of technical expertise. As
Alaska continues to be industralized and to become more populous, conflicts related to water
resource allocation will become more frequent, and the demands for their resolution will exceed
the capacities of any non-specialized legislative or judicial organization.
Under the administrative structure that prevailed until 1971, effluent discharge permits were
issued by the Department of Health and Welfare. On the federal level, comparable authority rests
in the Army Corps of Engineers. The state's water quality control functions have now been
transferred to the newly created Department of Environmental Conservation. Future legislation
might mandate the new agency to conduct a benefitlcostanalysis for each permit requested, and
require the department to establish such fees or charges as may be necessary and appropriate to
allocate the limited waste carrying capacity of the waters in question.
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An alternative solution might be to establish a Water Resources Evaluation Board within the new
department. Such a board could be appointed by the governor in staggered terms and be composed
of people with varied professional backgrounds representing diverse interests; for instance, a five
member board might be specified, containing a biologist, an engineer, an economist, a businessman
and a recognized "conservationist."
Another alternative would be to pattern the board after the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation
Committee, with its membership being representative of the various executive agencies having
concern with water pollution and resource allocation problems. These would include the
Department of Fish and Game, the Department of Health and Welfare, various divisions within the
Department of Natural Resources such as Parks, Petroleum, and the Department of Environmental
Conservation.
Anyone wishing to conduct activities that would alter certain well defined characteristics of the
public waters would be required by law to submit an application to the Department of
Environmental Conservation. The Department would prepare a water utilization impact study
attempting to identify all possible adverse effects of the proposed use. If the anticipated impact
exceeded a certain prescribed measure, a public hearing would be called after publication of the
study and the passage of a reasonable digestion period. The board would determine on the basis of
the application, the utilization impact study, and the hearing record, whether the proposed
discharge should be allowed and, if so, the appropriate charge. That charge could be as high as the
board might determine appropriate, but in order to emphasize the fact that the permitee is
purchasing a productive service from the public, there would be a minimum fee-perhaps $10 per
year. The criteria to be used in setting these fees would be laid down by the legislature, but in
general could follow the lines discussed 'above.
The fees could.OO assessed per unit of effluent, suspended particulate matter, biochemical oxygen
demand (BOD), the degree to which such measures as temperature, pH, or dissolved oxygen
content of the waters are altered, or any other measure of utilization or degradation considered
appropriate. Once established, a fee schedule would remain in force until reviewed. Review might
be initiated by public request, the applicant's request, by submission of a revised impact study
from the Department of Environmental Conservation, the Board's oWn motion, or automaticaUy
on receipt of an additional request to use the same waters for a simi/aror competing use.
This particular governmental structure has been presented in detail for the sole purpose of
illustrating the implementation of the abstract but basically simple concepts discussed earlier.
Political and social factors have been deliberately ignored in order to focus attention to these
concepts, but even from a strictly economic viewpoint the institutional structure outlined here can
probablY be improved.
The heart of any such reorganization, however, is legislation to permit the use of the price system,
at least in those cases where the equity and efficiency of the market solution is not in doubt.
Clearly this includes those cases where the waste carrying capacity of a watercourse has been
limited to what a pollution management authority declares as acceptable, and this limited capacity
must be rationed among several competing commercial firms andlor domestic sewer systems. Such
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a reorganization might go further, formalizing the collection of information on both benefits and
costs, requiring the distribution of such information, and encouraging its careful analysIs, with the
final result of a general~-but not slavish-commitment to the use of the market system as a tool of
allocating the benefits of water resource USB. •
Arguments and Counterarguments
Even if the concept idealized above were embodied in legislation, attainment of the management
goals discussed in Part I would be by no means assured. An essential prerequisite is that policy
makers and the electorate have an intuitive grasp of the logic of decentralizing some of the
decision making authority in water resource management. Despite Alaska's outside reputation for
"development at any cost," it has been the authors' experience that the Alaskans are at least as
aware as Americans in general of the environmental degradation that has taken place elsewhere; on
the whole they are genuinely committed to preventing similar degradation in Alaska. Many people
who are most concerned with environmental quality feel that the loss of air and water quality in
the other states has been associated with and a consequence of rampant capitalist "free
enterprise," that is, of decentralized decision making based upon the price system. An
understandable inference is that society must forbid individual economic units the authority to
dump waste either in the water ot the air, and must concentrate this authority in the hands of the
government. In this context, the proposal advanced here to decentralize a part of the decision
making goes against the grain of the public's newly mobilized environmental conscience.
Conservationists increasingly have an ambivalent or hostile attitude both toward the price system
and toward the economics, whose resort to numbers and apparent desire to put a price on
"priceless" resources is an anathema. Itissometimes argued that the disposal of any residuals in
the public waters is contrary to the public interest. The implication of this position is either that
society derives no benefits at all from directly inexpensive waste disposal, or that the benefits
derived from the pristine character of any watercourse are so great that they outweigh the benefits
related to waste disposal efficiency from the tiniest increment of impurity.
A less doctrinaire conservationist position accepts the relativism of environmental "quality" and
the appropriateness of the cost-benefit pri nciple to issues of pollution. It is argued, however, that
the successful implementation of the ideas outlined here depends upon a governmental·
responsiveness to the public interest that is not obtainable. The critics suggest that narrowly based
economic interests exercise a disproportionate control over the political process; as a consequence,
policy makers charged with the responsibility for setting pollution charges will consistently be
biased towards fees that are too low.
This contention is neither categorically refutable, nor satisfactorily dealt with exclusively by
economic analysis. Not all those who advance the line of reasoning start from the same
assumptions. Those conservationists who do not basically distrust the judgment of the citizens, no
matter how effectively expressed by the political machinery, base their argument on the belief that
government responds effectively only to those political interest groups that can mobilize
concentrated economic power in support of their positions. ItfoJlows, they contend, that such
interests will control the fee setting process. However, other arrangements for water quality
I
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management-such as absolute prohibitions and prescriptive engineering specifications-are also
p.tently vulnerable to manipulation and corruption. Their formal inflexibility in the face of
varying economic circumstances inevitably creates instances where administrators-·or
courts-decide against enforcement, or permit long delays in enforcement. The absence of a
continuous schedule of charges scaled to the sociar costs of pollution makes the pen.lly to the
polluter for compliance a drastic one, and enchances his rewards from manipulating the system
through political pressure or litigation.
On the other hand, much of the political resistance to establishment of authoritative agencies for
environmental management is based on a fear on the part of industrial and municipal interests that
the mechanism will be biased in favor of environmental fundamentalism, that the concentrated
political power of the conservation movementwill determine water quality standards. It is further
feared that the management institutions and the courts will be used to harass and delay any
development, however beneficial, which uses water bodies for waste disposal.
The fears of both sides in this debate are realistic, and are supported by a considerable body of
experience with regulatory agencies in various fields. Ideally, an allocation mechanism should not
be vulnerable to capture by any one group of users, in this case by industrial interests, domestic
sanitation systems, riparian landowners, or outdoor recreationists. The choices for water quality
management in Alaska are not~ however, between corruptible mechanisms and those that are
wholly invulnerable to concentrated economic or political power. Among the ..imperfect--
alternatives, we believe that social options are most nearly approached with arrangements which
use the physical, biological, and economic information that is available, ina formal system of
analysis and decision whose criteria are uniform and objective. Yet the system ought to be one
that is continuously responsive to the various natural characteristics of and human demands upon
lJIIater resources, both among places and over time.
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